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Philosophers have recently found fertile ground in the area of intersection between 
neuroscience and criminal law. They have, for example, entered lively debates 
concerning the extent to which findings in neuroscience might undermine attributions 
of criminal responsibility, and whether and how neuroscientific evidence, such as brain 
scan results, should be used in criminal trials.1 
 
This philosophical attention has, for the most part, been limited to examining the ways 
in which neuroscience may bear on assignments of guilt and responsibility in criminal 
trials. Yet neuroscientific technologies are already playing other roles in the criminal 
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justice process. For example, criminal justice authorities sometimes mandate the 
administration of brain-active drugs as part of programmes to prevent recidivism; a 
number of European and North American criminal justice systems provide for the 
administration of drugs that attenuate sexual desire to prevent recidivism in sex 
offenders;2 and methadone treatment has been used in similar ways in offenders with a 
history of opioid abuse.3  
 
These interventions may well prove to be the vanguard of a much larger movement, for 
there is reason to believe that neuroscientific developments will yield further ‘crime-
preventing neurointerventions’ or ‘CPNs’—that is, interventions that exert a physical, 
chemical or biological effect on the brain in order to diminish the likelihood of some 
forms of criminal offending. For example, recent developments suggest that we may 
ultimately have at our disposal a range of drugs capable of suppressing violent 
aggression,4 and it is not difficult to imagine possible applications of such drugs within 
criminal justice. Indeed, such applications are likely to be politically attractive, give 
their potential to partially replace the very costly practice of incarceration. 
 
But should CPNs be used in criminal justice? More specifically, may the state ever 
permissibly impose CPNs as part of the criminal justice process, either unconditionally, 
                                                 
2 See Forsberg, Chapter 2, this volume, for a review.  
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or as a condition of parole or early release? These questions are the focus of this 
collection.  
 
The collection begins with an introduction to the scientific background of CPNs (Chew 
et al., Ch 1) and an examination of the ways in which they might be legally regulated 
(Forsberg, Ch 2). Matravers (Ch 3) then provides a survey of the ethical terrain, offering 
an analysis of how we ought to think about the ethical issues that bear on CPN use. He 
argues that context, such as the meaning of criminal justice practice in a jurisdiction, 
plays an important role. 
 
The subsequent chapters turn to assessing the arguments for and against CPN use. There 
is certainly something to be said in favour of CPNs. It is widely thought that preventing 
recidivism is one of the aims of criminal justice,5 yet existing means of pursuing this 
aim are often poorly effective, highly restrictive of basic freedoms, and significantly 
harmful. Incarceration, for example, tends to be disruptive of personal relationships and 
careers, detrimental to physical and mental health, highly restrictive of freedom of 
movement and association, and rarely more than modestly effective at preventing 
recidivism.6 Neurointerventions hold out the promise of preventing recidivism in ways 
that are both more effective, and more humane.  
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 On the other hand, the use of CPNs in criminal justice raises several ethical concerns. 
CPNs could be highly intrusive and may threaten fundamental human values, such as 
bodily integrity and freedom of thought. In addition, humanity has a track record of 
misguided, harmful and unwarrantedly coercive use of neurotechnological ‘solutions’ 
to criminality—witness, for example, the use of electrical brain implants and crude 
forms of psychosurgery to control aggression in the mid twentieth century.7 
 
In the embryonic ethical discussion of CPNs in the late twentieth century, the dominant 
criticism held that, like all medical interventions, CPNs should normally only be 
provided with the free consent of the recipient, but when they are imposed as part of 
the criminal justice process, even if only as a condition of parole or earlier release, there 
is no possibility of obtaining such consent.8 This view is defended by William Green: 
Voluntary consent depends upon a person’s ability to make a choice 
freely. The convicted rapist is faced with two options—a lengthy 
prison sentence or even death on the one hand and Depo-Provera [a 
form of chemical castration] or surgical castration on the other—
and cannot be said to have the capacity to act freely in making a 
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choice. Freedom of choice is impossible because the convict’s loss of 
liberty constitutes a deprivation of such a magnitude that he cannot 
choose freely and voluntarily, but he is forced to give consent to an 
alternative he would not otherwise have chosen. In such 
circumstances men are willing to ‘‘barter their bodies.”...As a 
consequence, the convicted rapist cannot give voluntary consent to 
an offer of probation which contains a surgical castration or Depo-
Provera.9  
Similarly, Kari Vanderzyl writes: 
[T]he doctrine of informed consent requires a knowledgeable and 
voluntary decision to undergo treatment, yet offering a convicted 
offender castration as an alternative to a lengthy prison sentence 
constitutes an inherently coercive practice rendering truly voluntary 
consent impossible. Thus, castration should be rejected as a 
condition of probation.10 
This position invites two questions. First, is the consent of an offender who chooses to 
undergo a CPN in exchange for early release always invalid? The thought that it is could 
be grounded on the claim, invoked by Vanderzyl, that linking agreement to receive a 
CPN with early release is coercive. But defenders of CPNs can contest this claim on 
several grounds. For example, it might be held that there is no coercion here if and 
because the state is not threatening to violate the offender’s rights or make him worse 
off than he would otherwise be. Alternatively, it might be argued that the intentional 
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conditions of coercion are not satisfied unless the state is dangling the threat of further 
detention with the intention of inducing agreement to undergo the CPN.  Pugh (Ch 4) 
considers how a defender of the coercion claim might respond to these arguments.  
 
Second, is valid consent really required for CPNs to be permissibly administered? 
Almost all interventions imposed by our criminal justice systems are imposed without 
the free consent of the offender, despite being interventions of the kind that would 
ordinarily require such consent. It would normally be seriously wrong to incarcerate a 
person without her consent, but many believe that when that person has committed a 
crime, it is sometimes permissible to do so—or at least it would be if incarceration 
practices were more humane. Perhaps, as McMahan (Ch 5) argues, it can also make one 
liable to the nonconsensual imposition of CPNs.  
 
This raises further questions. Is there anything that sets CPNs apart from incarceration, 
morally speaking? And if so, is the moral difference significant enough that, even 
though it is sometimes permissible (if indeed it is) to nonconsensually incarcerate 
offenders, it is never permissible to nonconsensually administer CPNs?  
 
One suggestion would be that, though medical interventions might be at least as 
effective as incarceration at realising one goal of criminal justice—the prevention of 
recidivism—they would violate the retributivist’s requirement that offenders are 
punished no more or less harshly than they deserve. Reducing prison terms and 
imposing CPNs would, it might be claimed, lead to underpunishment, in retributivist 
terms. However, in this volume, Ryberg (Ch 9) argues that this objection to CPN use 
fails, among other reasons because, if a nonconsensual CPN involves some 
inconvenience or suffering then there is, in his view, nothing to prevent it from counting 
as an element of a retributive punishment. On the other hand, Birks (Ch 19) considers 
whether CPNs could be used to satisfy the putative communicative requirement of 
justified punishment. He argues that mandatory CPNs cannot communicate deserved 
censure to offenders, and the offer of CPNs as a replacement for incarceration or in 
exchange for a shorter sentence can communicate deserved censure only in cases where 
the CPN has harmful effects.  
 
Another suggestion would be that nonconsensual CPNs are more problematic than 
incarceration because they infringe rights against bodily or mental interference that are 
not infringed by incarceration. In this vein, Bublitz (Ch 16) argues that mandatory CPNs 
infringe a collection of rights which aptly be labelled rights to ‘mental self-
determination’.   
 
Douglas has questioned whether an appeal to bodily interference could be sufficient to 
establish the impermissibility of nonconsensual CPNs11 and in this collection (Ch 11) 
offers a similar challenge to the appeal to mental interference, arguing that the mental 
interference involved in nonconsensual CPNs may be morally equivalent to that 
involved in some seemingly unobjectionable nudge-like environmental interventions. 
In response Shaw (Ch 17) argues that the combined violation of rights against bodily 
and mental interference may explain the impermissibility of nonconsensual CPNs. She 
argues that such combined violations express a high degree of disrespect for the 
offender.  
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 There may, however, be theoretical grounds for questioning the existence of the rights 
against bodily and mental interference that these authors discuss. These rights are most 
naturally thought of as elements or corollaries of a right to self-ownership, but Lippert-
Rasmussen (Ch 7) suggests that the existence of such a right would, when conjoined 
with the so-called ‘extended mind’ thesis, implausibly imply that our self-ownership 
rights extend beyond our bodies. His arguments suggest that we should reconsider 
common sense views about self-ownership. 
 
Perhaps, though, there are other rights that would be infringed by the imposition of 
CPNs. For example, it might be thought that imposing CPNs on offenders would 
infringe their rights to be treated as moral equals. Chris Bennett (Ch 14) pursues this 
line in developing and employing Ian Carter’s account of opacity respect. He argues 
that nonconsensual CPNs involve the disrespectful assessment and use of information 
on the offender. Meanwhile Liberto (Ch 10) considers whether a particular kind of 
CPN—the chemical castration of sex offenders—might violate sexual rights, finding 
that it need not do so.   
 
The more general question here is whether the use of CPNs in criminal justice 
invariably infringes at least one right held by the individual offender. Vallentyne (Ch 
6) takes up this question and argues that, even when CPNs are nonconsensual, there are 
circumstances in which they would infringe no right. He ends by specifying two 
conditions under which this is true.  
 
Bullock (Ch. 8) also takes up the challenge of identifying conditions for the permissible 
imposition of CPNs, but she approaches this issue from the perspective of a particular 
conception of the goals of such interventions. The purpose of imposing CPNs on 
offenders is typically assumed to be to ‘prevent recidivism’. But it is doubtful that this 
could be the final goal of imposing CPNs, or indeed, of any intervention that criminal 
justice systems might impose. More likely, it is a proximate goal that furthers the 
ultimate goal of protecting others from harm or preventing moral wrongdoing (where 
this is conceived of wrong in itself). An alternative possibility, however is that CPNs 
could be imposed for the purpose of facilitating the character development of the 
offender; they could, that is, be imposed as an instance of moral paternalism. This is 
the possibility examined by Bullock, who identifies several constraints on the 
permissible use of CPNs for this purpose.    
 
One aspect of CPNs that has until now received no sustained philosophical attention is 
humanity’s atrocious track record in this area. Though many authors note that CPNs 
have frequently been misused, the possibility that this might have ethical implications 
for how they should be used today has not been thoroughly interrogated. McTernan (Ch 
15) argues that the history of treating socially undesirable behaviour with medical 
interventions provides a defeasible reason against the use of contemporary and future 
CPNs. 
 
Existing discussion of CPNs has also been largely silent on the psychological details of 
how CPNs achieve their desired effects, yet these details might be crucial to their moral 
permissibility. McMillan (Ch 12) illustrates some of these nuances through a discussion 
of Anthony Burgess’ A Clockwork Orange, which is often mentioned but seldom 
explored in debate regarding CPNs.  
 
Finally, while most of the discussion of CPNs has focused on their possible use in adult 
criminal offenders, there are other populations in which we might imagine these 
interventions being used, or advocated for use. The contributions by Stemplowska and 
Clayton and Moles consider two such uses. Stemplowska argues that victims of 
wrongdoing are likely to have immunity from coercive CPNs, even if, in the absence 
of such interventions, they will fail to comply with their duties towards the wrongdoers 
(Ch 18). Clayton and Moles examine the possible use of CPNs in children, arguing that 
this would sometimes be permissible and indeed that moral constraints on CPN use in 
this population are less restrictive than those applying to their use in adults (Ch 13). 
 
Our primary goal in editing this collection has been to substantively advance the ethical 
debate on CPNs, but we hope that this book will also serve as a stimulus for further 
discussion on the topics that it addresses, and on related questions that remain 
uncharted. Three questions seem, to us, to be particularly worthy of further attention. 
 
First, what is the nature, scope, strength and robustness of our moral rights against 
mental interference? Several chapters in this volume advert to such a right, but with one 
notable exception12 it has received little philosophical attention, particularly in 
comparison with thoroughly analysed rights against bodily interference.  
 
                                                 
12 Jan Christoph Bublitz and Reinhard Merkel, ‘Crimes Against Minds: On Mental 
Manipulations, Harms and a Human Right to Mental Self-Determination’, Criminal Law and 
Philosophy 8 (2014), pp. 51–77. 
Second, what bearing do the ethical issues raised by forensic risk assessment have on 
the ethics of CPN use? In most applications, CPNs would only be considered for use in 
offenders who pose particularly serious risks to the public, or risks that are particularly 
likely to be amenable to mitigation via CPNs. But the algorithmic risk assessment tools 
that would probably be used to assess such risks raise a number of ethical questions of 
their own—questions, for example, about their reliance on statistical generalizations 
about demographic groups, and their potential to compound criminal justice systems’ 
biases against ethnic minorities. 
 
Third, how is the ethics of CPN use affected by the moral noncompliance of many 
existing criminal justice systems? When philosophers have discussed the practice of 
offering prisoners the choice between further imprisonment and a CPN, they have 
tended to assume that further imprisonment would itself be ethically permissible and 
assessed the offer of a CPN against that baseline. But several penal theorists argue that 
prevailing incarceration practices are in fact unjustifiably harsh. If they are right, how 
would this affect the arguments for and against CPN use? This issue is only just 
beginning to be addressed.13 
 
 
                                                 
13 For a rare example of a paper that addresses it, see Ryberg, chapter 9, this volume.  
